I study a dynamic problem in which a group of agents collaborate over time to complete a project. The project progresses at a rate that depends on the agents' e↵orts, and it generates a payo↵ upon completion. I show that agents work harder the closer the project is to completion, and members of a larger team work harder than members of a smaller team -both individually and on aggregate -if and only if the project is su ciently far from completion. I apply these results to determine the optimal size of a self-organized partnership, and to study the manager's problem who recruits agents to carry out a project, and must determine the team size and its members' incentive contracts. The main results are (i) that the optimal symmetric contract compensates the agents only upon completing the project, and (ii) the optimal team size decreases in the expected length of the project.
Introduction
Teamwork and projects are central in the organization of firms and partnerships. Most large corporations engage a substantial proportion of their workforce in teamwork (Lawler, Mohrman and Benson (2001) ), and organizing workers into teams has been shown to increase productivity in both manufacturing and service firms (Ichniowski and Shaw (2003) ). Moreover, the use of teams is especially common in situations in which the task at hand will result in a defined deliverable, and it will not be ongoing, but will terminate (Harvard Business School Press (2004) ). Motivated by these observations, I analyze a dynamic problem in which a group of agents collaborate over time to complete a project, and I address a number of questions that naturally arise in this environment. In particular, what is the e↵ect of the group size to the agents' incentives? How should a manager determine the team size and the agents' incentive contracts? For example, should they be rewarded for reaching intermediate milestones, and should rewards be equal across the agents?
I propose a continuous-time model, in which at every moment, each of n agents exerts costly e↵ort to bring the project closer to completion. The project progresses stochastically at a rate that is equal to the sum of the agents' e↵ort levels (i.e., e↵orts are substitutes), and it is completed when its state hits a pre-specified threshold, at which point each agent receives a lump sum payo↵ and the game ends. This model can be applied both within firms, for instance, to research teams in new product development or consulting projects, and across firms, for instance, to R&D joint ventures. More broadly, the model is applicable to settings in which a group of agents collaborate to complete a project, which progresses gradually, its expected duration is su ciently large such that the agents discounting time matters, and it generates a payo↵ upon completion. A natural example is the Myerlin Repair Foundation (MRF): a collaborative e↵ort among a group of leading scientists in quest of a treatment for multiple sclerosis (Lakhani and Carlile (2012) ). This is a long-term venture, progress is gradual, each principal investigator incurs an opportunity cost by allocating resources to MRF activities (which gives rise to incentives to free-ride), and it will pay o↵ predominantly when an acceptable treatment is discovered.
In Section 3, I characterize the Markov Perfect equilibrium (hereafter MPE) of this game, wherein at every moment, each agent observes the state of the project (i.e., how close it is to completion), and chooses his e↵ort level to maximize his expected discounted payo↵, while anticipating the strategies of the other agents. A key result is that each agent increases his e↵ort as the project progresses. Intuitively, because he discounts time and is compensated upon completion, his incentives are stronger the closer the project is to completion. An implication of this result is that e↵orts are strategic complements across time, in that a higher e↵ort level by one agent at time t brings the project (on expectation) closer to completion, which in turn incentivizes himself, as well as the other agents to raise their future e↵orts.
In Section 4, I examine the e↵ect of the team size to the agents' incentives. I show that members of a larger team work harder than members of a smaller team -both individually and on aggregate -if and only if the project is su ciently far from completion.
1 Intuitively, by increasing the size of the team, two forces influence the agents' incentives. First, they obtain stronger incentives to free-ride. However, because the total progress that needs to be carried out is fixed, the agents benefit from the ability to complete the project quicker, which increases the present discounted value of their reward, and consequently strengthens their incentives. I refer to these forces as the free-riding and the encouragement e↵ect, respectively. Because the marginal cost of e↵ort is increasing and agents work harder the closer the project is to completion, the free-riding e↵ect becomes stronger as the project progresses. On the other hand, the benefit of being able to complete the project faster in a bigger team is smaller the less progress remains, and hence the encouragement e↵ect becomes weaker with progress. As a result, the encouragement e↵ect dominates the free-riding e↵ect, and consequently members of a larger team work harder than those of a smaller team if and only if the project is su ciently far from completion.
I first apply this result to the problem faced by a group of agents organizing into a partnership. If the project is a public good so that each agent's reward is independent of the team size, then each agent is better o↵ expanding the partnership ad-infinitum. On the other hand, if the project generates a fixed payo↵ upon completion that is shared among the team members, then the optimal partnership size increases in the length of the project.
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Motivated by the fact that projects are often run by corporations (rather than self-organized partnerships), in Section 5, I introduce a manager who is the residual claimant of the project, and she recruits a group of agents to undertake it on her behalf. Her objective is to determine the size of the team and each agent's incentive contract to maximize her expected discounted profit.
First, I show that the optimal symmetric contract compensates the agents only upon completion of the project. The intuition is that by backloading payments (compared to rewarding the agents for reaching intermediate milestones), the manager can provide the same incentives at the early stages of the project (via continuation utility), while providing stronger incentives when the project is close to completion. This result simplifies the manager's problem to determining the team size and her budget for compensating the agents. Given a fixed team size, I show that the manager's optimal budget increases in the length of the project. This is intuitive: to incentivize the agents, the manager should compensate them more, the longer the project. Moreover, the optimal team size increases in the length of the project. Recall that a larger team works harder than a smaller one if the project is su ciently far from completion. Therefore, the benefit from a larger team working harder while the project is far from completion outweighs the loss from working less when it is close to completion only if the project is su ciently long. Lastly, I show that the manager can benefit from dynamically decreasing the size of the team as the project nears completion. The intuition is that she prefers a larger team while the project is far from completion since it works harder than a smaller one, while a smaller team becomes preferable near completion.
The restriction to symmetric contracts in not without loss of generality. In particular, the scheme wherein the size of the team decreases dynamically as the project progresses can be implemented with an asymmetric contract that rewards the agents upon reaching di↵erent milestones. Finally, with two (identical) agents, I show that the manager is better o↵ compensating them asymmetrically if the project is su ciently short. Intuitively, the agent who receives the larger reward will carry out the larger share of the work in equilibrium, and hence he cannot free-ride on the other agent as much.
First and foremost, this paper is related to the moral hazard in teams literature (Holmström (1982) , Ma, Moore and Turnbull (1988) , Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) , Legros and Matthews (1993) , Strausz (1999) , and others). These papers focus on the free-rider problem that arises when each agent must share the output of his e↵ort with the other members of the team, and they explore ways to restore e ciency. My paper ties in with this literature in that it analyzes a dynamic game of moral hazard in teams with stochastic output.
Closer related to this paper is the literature on dynamic contribution games, and in particular, the papers that study threshold or discrete public good games. Formalizing the intuition of Schelling (1960) , Admati and Perry (1991) and Marx and Matthews (2000) show that contributing little by little over multiple periods, each conditional on the previous contributions of the other agents, mitigates the free-rider problem. Lockwood and Thomas (2002) and Compte and Jehiel (2004) show how gradualism can arise in dynamic contribution games, while Battaglini, Nunnari and Palfrey (2013) compare the set of equilibrium outcomes when contributions are reversible to the case in which they are not. Whereas these papers focus on characterizing the equilibria of dynamic contribution games, my primary focus is on the organizational questions that arise in the context of such games.
Yildirim (2006) studies a game in which the project comprises of multiple discrete stages, and in every period, the current stage is completed if at least one agent exerts e↵ort. E↵ort is binary, and each agent's e↵ort cost is private information, and re-drawn from a common distribution in each period. In contrast, in my model, following Kessing (2007) , the project progresses at a rate that depends smoothly on the team's aggregate e↵ort. Yildirim (2006) and Kessing (2007) show that if the project generates a payo↵ only upon completion, then contributions are strategic complements across time even if there are no complementarities in the agents' production function. This is in contrast to models in which the agents receive flow payo↵s while the project is in progress (Fershtman and Nitzan (1991) ), and models in which the project can be completed instantaneously (Bonatti and Hörner (2011) ), where contributions are strategic substitutes. Yildirim also examines how the team size influences the agents' incentives in a dynamic environment, and he shows that members of a larger team work harder than those of a smaller team at the early stages of the project, while the opposite is true at its later stages. 3 This result is similar to Theorem 2 (i) in this paper. However, leveraging the tractability of my model, I also characterize the relationship between aggregate e↵ort and the team size, which is the crucial metric for determining the manager's optimal team size.
In summary, my contributions to this literature are two-fold. First, I propose a natural framework to analyze the dynamic problem faced by a group of agents who collaborate over time to complete a project. The model provides several testable implications, and the framework proposed in this paper can be useful for studying other dynamic moral hazard problems with multiple agents; for example, the joint extraction of an exhaustible common resource, or a tug of war between two teams (in the spirit of Cao (2014)), or a game of oligopolistic competition 3 It is worth pointing out however that in Yildirim's model, this result hinges on the assumption that in every period, each agent's e↵ort cost is re-drawn from a non-degenerate distribution. In contrast, if e↵ort costs are deterministic, then this comparative static is reversed: the game becomes a dynamic version of the "reporting a crime" game (ch. 4.8 in Osborne (2003) ), and one can show that in the unique symmetric, mixed-strategy MPE, both the probability that each agent exerts e↵ort, and the probability that at least one agent exerts e↵ort at any given stage of the project (which is the metric for individual and aggregate e↵ort, respectively) decreases in the team size.
with demand that is correlated across time (as in Section IV of Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007) ). Moreover, in an earlier version of this paper, I also analyze the cases in which the agents are asymmetric and the project size is endogenous (Georgiadis (2011) ). Second, I derive insights for the organization of partnerships, and for team design where a manager must determine the size of her team and the agents' incentive contracts. To the best of my knowledge, this is one of the first papers to study this problem; one notable exception being Rahmani, Roels and Karmarkar (2013) , who study the contractual relationship between the members of a two-person team. This paper is also related to the literature on free-riding in groups. To explain why teamwork often leads to increased productivity in organizations in spite of the theoretical predictions that e↵ort and group size should be inversely related (Olson (1965) and Andreoni (1988) ), scholars have argued that teams benefit from mutual monitoring (Alchian and Demsetz (1972) ), peer pressure to achieve a group norm (Kandel and Lazear (1992) ), complementary skills (Lazear (1998) ), warm-glow (Andreoni (1990) ), and non-pecuniary benefits such as more engaging work and social interaction. While these forces are helpful for explaining the benefits of teamwork, this paper shows that they are actually not necessary in settings in which the team's e↵orts are geared towards completing a project.
Lastly, the existence proofs of Theorems 1 and 3 are based on Hartman (1960) , while the proof techniques for the comparative statics draw from Cao (2014) , who studies a continuous-time version of the patent race of Harris and Vickers (1985) .
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 characterizes the Markov Perfect equilibrium of the game, and establishes some basic results. Section 4 examines how the size of the team influences the agents' incentives, and characterizes the optimal partnership size. Section 5 studies the manager's problem, and Section 6 concludes. Appendix A contains a discussion of non-Markovian strategies and four extensions of the base model. The major proofs are provided in Appendix B, while the omitted proofs are available in the online Appendix.
The Model
A team of n agents collaborate to complete a project. Time t 2 [0, 1) is continuous. The project starts at some initial state q 0 < 0, its state q t evolves according to a stochastic process, and it is completed at the first time ⌧ such that q t hits the completion state which is normalized to 0. Agent i 2 {1, .., n} is risk neutral, discounts time at rate r > 0, and receives a pre-specified reward V i > 0 upon completing the project. 4 An incomplete project has zero value. At every moment t, each agent observes the state of the project q t , and privately chooses his e↵ort level to influence the drift of the stochastic process
where a i,t 0 denotes the e↵ort level of agent i at time t, > 0 captures the degree of uncertainty associated with the evolution of the project, and W t is a standard Brownian motion. 5, 6 As such, |q 0 | can be interpreted as the expected length of the project. 7 Finally, each agent is credit constrained, his e↵ort choices are not observable to the other agents, and his flow cost of exerting e↵ort a is given by c (a) = a p+1
p+1
, where p 1.
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At every moment t, each agent i observes the state of the project q t , and chooses his e↵ort level a i,t to maximize his expected discounted payo↵ while taking into account the e↵ort choices a i,s of the other team members. As such, for a given set of strategies, his expected discounted payo↵ is given by
where the expectation is taken with respect to ⌧ : the random variable that denotes the completion time of the project.
Assuming that J i (·) is twice di↵erentiable for all i, and using standard arguments (Dixit (1999) ), one can derive the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (hereafter HJB) equation for the ex-4 In the base model, the project generates a payo↵ only upon completion. The case in which the project also generates a flow payo↵ while it is in progress is examined in Appendix A.1, and it is shown that the main results continue to hold.
5 For simplicity, I assume that the variance of the stochastic process (i.e., ) does not depend on the agents' e↵ort levels. While the case in which e↵ort influences both the drift and the di↵usion of the stochastic process is intractable, numerical examples with
1/2 dW t suggest that the main results continue to hold. See Appendix A.3 for details. 6 I assume that e↵orts are perfect substitutes. To capture the notion that when working in teams, agents may be more (less) productive due to complementary skills (coordination costs), one can consider a super-(sub-) additive production function such as
where > 1 (0 < < 1). The main results continue to hold.
7 Because the project progresses stochastically, the total amount of e↵ort to complete it may be greater or smaller than |q 0 |. 8 The case in which c (·) is an arbitrary strictly increasing and convex function is discussed in Remark 1, while the case in which e↵ort costs are linear is analyzed in Appendix A.5 The restriction that p 1 is necessary only for establishing that a MPE exists. If the conditions in Remark 1 are satisfied, then all results continue to hold for any p > 0.
pected discounted payo↵ function of agent i:
subject to the boundary conditions (3).
A MPE is characterized by the system of ODE defined by (4) subject to the boundary conditions (3) for all i 2 {1, .., n}. To establish existence of a MPE, it su ces to show that a solution to this system exists. I then show that this system has a unique solution if the agents are symmetric (i.e., V i = V j for all i 6 = j). Together with the facts that every MPE must satisfy this system and the first-order condition is both necessary and su cient, it follows that the MPE is unique in this case. Theorem 1. A Markov Perfect equilibrium (MPE) for the game defined by (1) exists. For each agent i, the expected discounted payo↵ function J i (q) satisfies: 
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Because the agents incur the cost of e↵ort at the time e↵ort is exerted but are only compensated upon completing the project, their incentives are stronger, the closer the project is to completion: a 0 i (q) > 0 for all q. An implication of this result is that e↵orts are strategic complements across time. That is because a higher e↵ort by an agent at time t brings the project (on expectation) closer to completion, which in turn incentivizes himself, as well as the other agents to raise their e↵ort at times t 0 > t.
Note that Theorem 1 hinges on the assumption that r > 0. If the agents are patient (i.e., r = 0), then in equilibrium, each agent will always exert e↵ort 0.
13 Therefore, this model is applicable to projects whose expected duration is su ciently large such that the agents discounting time matters
11 To simplify notation, if the agents are symmetric, then the subscript i is interchanged with the subscript n to denote the team size throughout the remainder of this paper.
12 If c 0 (0) > 0, then there exists a quitting threshold Q q , such that each agent exerts 0 e↵ort on ( 1, Q q ], while he exerts strictly positive e↵ort on (Q q , 0], and his e↵ort increases in q.
13 If = 0, because e↵ort costs are convex and the agents do not discount time, in any equilibrium in which the project is completed, each agent finds it optimal to exert an arbitrarily small amount of e↵ort over an arbitrarily large time horizon, and complete the project asymptotically. (A project-completing equilibrium exists only if c 0 (0) is su ciently close to 0.) Remark 1. For a MPE to exist, it su ces that c (·) is strictly increasing and convex with c (0) = 0, it satisfies the INADA condition lim a!1 c 0 (a) = 1, and
and p 1, then the LHS equals 1, so that the inequality is always satisfied. On the other hand, if p 2 (0, 1), then the inequality is satisfied only if P n i=1 V i , r and n are su ciently small, or if is su ciently large. More generally, this inequality is satisfied if c (·) is su ciently convex.
The existence proof requires that J i (·) and J 0 i (·) are always bounded. It is easy to show that
0 for all i and q. The inequality in Remark 1 ensures that the marginal cost of e↵ort c 0 (a) is su ciently large for large values of a that no agent ever has an incentive to exert an arbitrarily high e↵ort, which by the first order condition implies that
Remark 2. An important assumption of the model is that the agents are compensated only upon completion of the project. In Appendix A.1, I consider the case in which during any interval (t, t + dt) while the project is in progress, each agent receives a flow payo↵ h (q t ) dt, in addition to the lump sum reward V upon completion. Assuming that h (·) is increasing and satisfies certain regularity conditions, there exists a threshold ! (not necessarily interior) such that a 0 n (q) 0 if and only if q  !; i.e., e↵ort is hump-shaped in progress.
The intuition why e↵ort can decrease in q follows by noting that as the project nears completion, each agent's flow payo↵ becomes larger, which in turn decreases his marginal benefit from bringing the project closer to completion. Numerical analysis indicates that this threshold is interior as long as the magnitude of the flow payo↵s is su ciently large relative to V .
Remark 3. The model assumes that the project is never "canceled". If there is an exogenous cancellation state Q C < q 0 < 0 such that the project is canceled (and the agents receive payo↵ 0) at the first time that q t hits Q C , then statements (i) and (ii) of Theorem 1 continue to hold, but e↵ort needs no longer be increasing in q. Instead, there exists a threshold ! (not necessarily interior) such that a 0 n (q)  0 if and only if q  !; i.e., e↵ort is U-shaped in progress. See Appendix A.2 for details.
Intuitively, the agents have incentives to exert e↵ort (i) to complete the project, and (ii) to avoid hitting the cancellation state Q C . Because the incentives due to the former (latter) are stronger the closer the project is to completion (to Q C ), depending on the choice of Q C , the agent's incentives may be stronger near Q C and near the completion state relative to the midpoint. Numerical analysis indicates that ! = 0 so that e↵ort increases monotonically in q if Q C is su ciently small; it is interior if Q C is in some intermediate range, and ! = 1 so that e↵ort always decreases in q if Q C is su ciently close to 0.
Remark 4. Agents have been assumed to have outside option 0. In a symmetric team, if each agent has a positive outside option u > 0, then there exists an optimal abandonment state Q A > 1 satisfying the smooth-pasting condition @ @q J n (q, Q A )
q=Q A = 0 such that the agents find it optimal to abandon the project at the first moment q hits Q A , where
In this case, each agent's e↵ort increases monotonically with progress.
Comparative Statics
This Section establishes some comparative statics, which are helpful to understand how the agents' incentives depend on the parameters of the problem. To examine the e↵ect of each parameter to the agents' incentives, I consider two symmetric teams that di↵er in exactly one attribute: their members' rewards V , patience levels r, or the volatility of the project .
14 Proposition 1. Consider two teams comprising of symmetric agents.
(i) If V 1 < V 2 , then all other parameters held constant, a 1 (q) < a 2 (q) for all q.
(ii) If r 1 > r 2 , then all other parameters held constant, there exists an interior threshold
The intuition behind statement (i) is straightforward. If the agents receive a bigger reward, then they always work harder in equilibrium.
Statement (ii) asserts that less patient agents work harder than more patient agents if and only if the project is su ciently close to completion. Intuitively, less patient agents have more to gain from an earlier completion (provided that the project is su ciently close to completion).
14 Since the teams are symmetric and di↵er in a single parameter (e.g., their reward V i in statement (i)), abusing notation, I let a i (·) denote each agent's e↵ort strategy corresponding to the parameter with subscript i.
15 Unable to show that J 000 i (q) is unimodal in q, this result does not guarantee that ⇥ ,1 = ⇥ ,2 , which implies that it does not provide any prediction about how the agents' e↵ort depends on when q 2 [⇥ ,1 , ⇥ ,2 ]. However, numerical analysis indicates that in fact ⇥ ,1 = ⇥ ,2 .
However, bringing the completion time forward requires that they exert more e↵ort, the cost of which is incurred at the time that e↵ort is exerted, whereas the reward is only collected upon completion of the project. Therefore, the benefit from bringing the completion time forward (by exerting more e↵ort) outweighs its cost only when the project is su ciently close to completion.
Finally, statement (iii) asserts that incentives become stronger in the volatility of the project when it is far from completion, while the opposite is true when it gets close to completion. As the volatility increases, it becomes more likely that the project will be completed either earlier than expected (upside), or later than expected (downside). If the project is su ciently far from completion, then J i (q) is close to 0 so that the downside is negligible, while J 00 i (q) > 0 implies that the upside is not (negligible), and consequently a 1 (q) a 2 (q). On the other hand, because the completion time of the project is non-negative, the upside diminishes as it approaches completion, which implies that the downside is bigger than the upside, and consequently a 1 (q)  a 2 (q).
Comparison with First-Best Outcome
To obtain a benchmark for the agents' equilibrium e↵ort levels, I compare them to the firstbest outcome, where at every moment, each agent chooses his e↵ort level to maximize the team's, as opposed to his individual expected discounted payo↵. I focus on the symmetric case, and denote byĴ n (q) andâ n (q) the first-best expected discounted payo↵ and e↵ort level of each member of an n-person team, respectively. The first-best e↵ort level satisfiesâ n (q) 2 arg max a n anĴ
, and the first-order condition implies thatâ
n (q) subject to the boundary conditions (3). It is straight-forward to show that the properties established in Theorem 1 apply forĴ n (q) andâ n (q). In particular, the first-best ODE subject to (3) has a unique solution, andâ 0 n (q) > 0 for all q; i.e., similar to the MPE, the first-best e↵ort level increases with progress.
The following Proposition compares each agent's e↵ort and his expected discounted payo↵ in the MPE to the first best outcome.
Proposition 2. In a team of n 2 agents, a n (q) <â n (q) and
This result is intuitive: because each agent's reward is independent of his contribution to the project, he has incentives to free-ride. As a result, in equilibrium, each agent exerts strictly less e↵ort and he is strictly worse o↵ at every state of the project relative to the case in which agents behave collectively by choosing their e↵ort level at every moment to maximize the team's expected discounted payo↵.
Remark 5. A natural question is whether the agents can increase their expected discounted payo↵ by adopting non-Markovian strategies, so that their e↵ort at t depends on the entire evolution path of the project {q s } st . While a formal analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, the analysis of Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007) , who study a related model, suggests that no, there does not exist a symmetric Public Perfect equilibrium (hereafter PPE) in which agents can achieve a higher expected discounted payo↵ than the MPE at any state of the project. See Appendix A.4 for details.
It is important to emphasize however that this conjecture hinges upon the assumption that the agents cannot observe each other's e↵ort choices. For example, if e↵orts are publicly observable, then in addition to the MPE characterized in Theorem 1, using a similar approach as in Georgiadis, Lippman and Tang (2014) , who study a deterministic version of this model (i.e., with = 0), one can show that there exists a PPE in which the agents exert the first-best e↵ort level along the equilibrium path. Such equilibrium is supported by trigger strategies, wherein at every moment t, each agent exerts the first-best e↵ort level if all agents have exerted the first-best e↵ort level for all s < t, while he reverts to the MPE otherwise.
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The E↵ect of Team Size
When examining the relationship between the agents' incentives and the size of the team, it is important to consider how each agent's reward depends on the team size. I consider the following (natural) cases: the public good allocation scheme, wherein each agent receives a reward V upon completing the project irrespective of the team size, and the budget allocation scheme, wherein each agent receives a reward V n upon completing the project.
With n symmetric agents, each agent's expected discounted payo↵ function satisfies
under the public good or the budget allocation scheme, respectively.
The following Theorem shows that under both allocation schemes, members of a larger team work harder than members of a smaller team -both individually and on aggregate -if and only if the project is su ciently far from completion. Figure 1 illustrates an example.
Theorem 2. Consider two teams comprising of n and m > n identical agents. Under both allocation schemes, all other parameters held constant, there exist thresholds ⇥ n,m and n,m such that (i) a m (q) a n (q) if and only if q  ⇥ n,m ; and (ii) ma m (q) na n (q) if and only if q  n,m . By increasing the size of the team, two opposing forces influence the agents' incentives: First, agents obtain stronger incentives to free-ride. To see why, consider an agent's dilemma at time t to (unilaterally) reduce his e↵ort by a small amount " for a short interval . By doing so, he saves approximately "c 0 (a (q t )) in e↵ort costs, but at t + , the project is " father from completion. In equilibrium, this agent will carry out only 1 n of that lost progress, which implies that the benefit from shirking increases in the team size. Second, recall that each agent's incentives are proportional to the marginal benefit of bringing the completion time ⌧ forward:
, which implies that holding strategies fixed, an increase in the team size decreases the completion time of the project, and hence strengthens the agents' incentives. Following the terminology of Bolton and Harris (1999) , who study an experimentation in teams problem, I refer to these forces as the free-riding and the encouragement e↵ect, respectively, and the intuition will follow from examining how the magnitude of these e↵ects changes as the project progresses.
It is convenient to consider the deterministic case in which = 0. Because c 0 (0) = 0 and e↵ort vanishes as q ! 1, and noting that each agent's gain from free-riding is proportional to c 0 (a (q)), it follows that the free-riding e↵ect is negligible when the project is su ciently far from completion. As the project progresses, the agents raise their e↵ort, and because e↵ort costs are convex, the free-riding e↵ect becomes stronger. The magnitude of the encouragement e↵ect can be measured by the ratio of the marginal benefits of bringing the completion time forward: rV 2n e r⌧ 2 rVne r⌧ = V 2n Vn e r⌧ 2 . Observe that this ratio increases in ⌧ , which implies that the encouragement e↵ect becomes weaker as the project progresses (i.e., as ⌧ becomes smaller), and it diminishes under public good allocation (since V 2n /Vn = 1) while it becomes negative under budget allocation (since V 2n /Vn < 1).
In summary, under both allocation schemes, the encouragement e↵ect dominates the freeriding e↵ect if and only if the project is su ciently far from completion. This implies that by increasing the team size, the agents obtain stronger incentives when the project is far from completion, while their incentives become weaker near completion.
Turning attention to the second statement, it follows from statement (i) that aggregate e↵ort in the larger team exceeds that in the smaller team if the project is far from completion. Perhaps surprisingly however, when the project is near completion, not only the individual e↵ort, but also the aggregate e↵ort in the larger team is less than that in the smaller team. The intuition follows by noting that when the project is very close to completion (e.g., q t = ✏), this game resembles the (static) "reporting a crime" game (ch. 4.8 in Osborne (2003)), and it is well-known that in the unique symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of this game, the probability that at least one agent exerts e↵ort (which is analogous to aggregate e↵ort) decreases in the group size. The same proof technique can be used to show that under both allocation schemes, the firstbest aggregate e↵ort increases in the team size at every q. This di↵erence is a consequence of the free-riding e↵ect being absent in this case, so that the encouragement e↵ect alone leads a larger team to always work on aggregate harder than a smaller team.
It is noteworthy that the thresholds of Theorem 2 need not always be interior. Under budget allocation, it is possible that ⇥ n,m = 1, which would imply that each member of the smaller team always works harder than each member of the larger team. However, numerical analysis indicates that ⇥ n,m is always interior under both allocation schemes. Turning to n,m , the proof of Theorem 2 ensures that it is interior only under budget allocation if e↵ort costs are quadratic, while one can find examples in which n,m is interior as well as examples in which n,m = 0 otherwise. Numerical analysis indicates that the most important parameter that determines whether n,m is interior is the convexity of the e↵ort cost function, and it is interior as long as c (·) is not too convex (i.e., p is su ciently small). This is intuitive, as more convex e↵ort costs favor the larger team more.
17 In addition, under public good allocation, for n,m to be interior, it is also necessary that n and m are su ciently small. Intuitively, this is because the size of the pie increases in the team size under this scheme, which (again) favors the larger team. Figure 2 illustrates an example with quartic e↵ort costs (i.e., p = 3) in which case ⇥ n,m is interior but n,m = 0 under both allocation schemes.
Partnership Formation
In this Section, I examine the problem faced by a group of agents who seek to organize into a partnership. The following Proposition characterizes the optimal partnership size.
Proposition 3. Suppose that the partnership composition is finalized before the agents begin to work, so that the optimal partnership size satisfies arg max n {J n (q 0 )}. (i) Under public good allocation, the optimal partnership size n = 1 independent of the project length |q 0 |.
(ii) Under budget allocation, the optimal partnership size n increases in the project length |q 0 |. e↵ort costs are linear, and I establish an analogous result to Theorem 2: members an (n + 1)-person team have stronger incentives relative to those of an n-person team as long as n is su ciently small. Increasing the size of the partnership has two e↵ects. First, the expected completion time of the project changes; from Theorem 2 it follows that it decreases, thus increasing each agent's expected discounted reward, if the project is su ciently long. Second, in equilibrium, each agent will exert less e↵ort to complete the project, which implies that his total expected discounted cost of e↵ort decreases. This Proposition shows that if each agent's reward does not depend on the partnership size (i.e., under public good allocation), then the latter e↵ect always dominates the former, and hence agents are better o↵ the bigger the partnership. Under budget allocation however, these e↵ects outweigh the decrease in each agent's reward caused by the increase in the partnership size only if the project is su ciently long, and consequently, the optimal partnership size increases in the length of the project.
An important assumption underlying Proposition 3 is that the partnership composition is finalized before the agents begin to work. Under public good allocation, this assumption is without loss of generality, because the optimal partnership size is equal to 1 irrespective of the length of the project. However, it may not be innocuous under budget allocation, where the optimal partnership size does depend on the project length. If the partnership size is allowed to vary with progress, an important modeling assumption is how the rewards of new and exiting members will be determined. While a formal analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, abstracting from the above modeling issue and based on Theorem 2, it is reasonable to conjecture that the agents will have incentives to expand the partnership after setbacks, and to decrease its size as the project nears completion.
Manager's Problem
Most projects require substantial capital to cover infrastructure and operating costs. For example, the design of a new pharmaceutical drug, in addition to the scientists responsible for the drug design (i.e., the project team), necessitates a laboratory, expensive and maintenanceintensive machinery, as well as support sta↵. Because individuals are often unable to cover these costs, projects are often run by corporations instead of the project team, which raises the questions of (i) how to determine the optimal team size, and (ii) how to best incentivize the agents. These questions are addressed in this Section, wherein I consider the case in which a third party (to be referred to as a manager) is the residual claimant of the project, and she hires a group of agents to undertake it on her behalf. Section 5.1 describes the model, Section 5.2 establishes some of the properties of the manager's problem, and Section 5.3 studies her contracting problem.
The Model with a Manager
The manager is the residual claimant of the project, she is risk neutral, and she discounts time at the same rate r > 0 as the agents. The project has (expected) length |q 0 |, and it generates a payo↵ U > 0 upon completion. To incentivize the agents, at time 0, the manager commits to an incentive contract that specifies the size of the team, denoted by n, a set of milestones q 0 < Q 1 < .. < Q K = 0 (where K 2 N), and for every k 2 {1, .., K}, allocates non-negative payments
that are due upon reaching milestone Q k for the first time. 
The Manager's Profit Function
I begin by considering the case in which the manager compensates the agents only upon completing the project, and I show in Theorem 3 that her problem is well-defined and it satisfies some desirable properties. Then I explain how this result extends to the case in which the manager also rewards the agents for reaching intermediate milestones.
Given the team size n and the agents' rewards {V i } n i=1 that are due upon completion of the project (where I can assume without loss of generality that P n i=1 V i  U ), the manager's expected discounted profit function can be written as
where the expectation is taken with respect to the project's completion time ⌧ , which depends on the agents' strategies and the stochastic evolution of the project.
19 By using the first order condition for each agent's equilibrium e↵ort as determined in Section 3, the manager's expected discounted profit at any given state of the project satisfies
defined on ( 1, 0] subject to the boundary conditions
where J i (q) satisfies (2) subject to (3). The interpretation of these conditions is similar to (3). As the state of the project diverges to 1, its expected completion time diverges to 1, and because r > 0, the manager's expected discounted profit diminishes to 0. On the other hand, the manager's profit is realized when the project is completed, and it equals her payo↵ U less the payments
), a solution to the manager's problem defined by (5) subject to the boundary conditions (6) and the agents' problem as defined in Theorem 1 exists, and it has the following properties:
(ii) F (·) is unique if the agents' rewards are symmetric (i.e., if V i = V j for i 6 = j). Now let us discuss how Theorems 1 and 3 extend to the case in which the manager rewards the agents upon reaching intermediate milestones. Recall that she can designate a set of milestones, and attach rewards to each milestone that are due as soon as the project reaches the respective milestone for the first time. Let J i,k (·) denote agent i's expected discounted payo↵ given that the project has reached k 1 milestones, which is defined on ( 1, Q k ], and note that it satisfies (4) subject to lim q! 1 J i,k (q) = 0 and
The second boundary condition states that upon reaching milestone k, agent i receives the reward attached to that milestone, plus the continuation value from future rewards. Starting with J i,K (·), it is straightforward that it satisfies the properties of Theorem 1, and in particular, that J i,K (Q k 1 ) is unique (as long as rewards are symmetric) so that the boundary condition of J i,K 1 (·) at Q K 1 is well-defined. Proceeding backwards, it follows that for every k, J i,k (·) satisfies the properties of Theorem 1.
To examine the manager's problem, let F k (·) denote her expected discounted profit given that the project has reached k 1 milestones, which is defined on ( 1, Q k ], and note that it satisfies (5) subject to lim
The second boundary condition states that upon reaching milestone k, the manager receives the continuation value of the project, less the payments that she disburses to the agents for reaching this milestone. Again starting with k = K and proceeding backwards, it is straightforward that for all k, F k (·) satisfies the properties established in Theorem 3.
Contracting Problem
The manager's problem entails choosing the team size and the agents' incentive contracts to maximize her ex-ante expected discounted profit subject to the agents' incentive compatibility constraints. 20 I begin by analyzing symmetric contracts. Then I examine how the manager can increase her expected discounted profit with asymmetric contracts.
Symmetric Contracts
The following Theorem shows that within the class of symmetric contracts, one can without loss of generality restrict attention to those that compensate the agents only upon completion of the project.
Theorem 4. The optimal symmetric contract compensates the agents only upon completion of the project.
To prove this result, I consider an arbitrary set of milestones and arbitrary rewards attached to each milestone, and I construct an alternative contract that rewards the agents only upon completing the project and renders the manager better o↵. Intuitively, because rewards are sunk in terms of incentivizing the agents after they are disbursed, and all parties are risk neutral and they discount time at the same rate, by backloading payments, the manager can provide the same incentives at the early stages of the project, while providing stronger incentives when it is close to completion.
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This result is consistent with practice, as evidenced for example by Lewis and Bajari (2014) , who study incentive contracts in highway construction projects. Moreover, it is valuable from an analytical perspective, because it reduces the infinite-dimensional problem of determining the team size, the number of milestones, the set of milestones, and the rewards attached to each milestone into a two-dimensional problem, in which the manager only needs to determine her budget B = P n i=1 V i for compensating the agents and the team size. The following Propositions characterize the manager's optimal budget and her optimal team size.
Proposition 4. Suppose that the manager employs n agents whom she compensates symmetrically. Then her optimal budget B increases in the length of the project |q 0 |. Contemplating an increase in her budget, the manager trades o↵ a decrease in her net profit U B and an increase in the project's expected present discounted value E ⌧ [e r⌧ | q 0 ]. Because a longer project takes (on average) a larger amount of time to be completed, a decrease in her net profit has a smaller e↵ect on her ex-ante expected discounted profit the longer the project. Therefore, the benefit from raising the agents' rewards outweighs the decrease in her net profit if and only if the project is su ciently long, which in turn implies that the manager's optimal budget increases in the length of the project. Lemma 1. Suppose that the manager has a fixed budget B and she compensates the agents symmetrically. For any m > n, there exists a threshold T n,m such that she prefers employing an m-member team instead of an n-member team if and only if |q 0 | T n,m . Given a fixed budget, the manager's objective is to choose the team size to minimize the expected completion time of the project. This is equivalent to maximizing the aggregate e↵ort of the team along the evolution path of the project. Hence, the intuition behind this result follows from statement (B) of Theorem 2. If the project is short, then on expectation, the aggregate e↵ort of the smaller team will be greater than that of the larger team due to the free-riding e↵ect (on average) dominating the encouragement e↵ect. The opposite is true if the project is long. Figure 3 illustrates an example.
Applying the Monotonicity Theorem of Milgrom and Shannon (1994) leads one to the following Proposition. Proposition 5. Given a fixed budget to (symmetrically) compensate a group of agents, the manager's optimal team size n increases in the length of the project |q 0 |.
Proposition 5 suggests that a larger team is more desirable while the project is far from completion, whereas a smaller team becomes preferable when the project gets close to completion. Therefore, it seems desirable to construct a scheme that dynamically decreases the team size as the project progresses. Suppose that the manager employs two identical agents on a fixed budget, and she designates a retirement state R, such that one of the agents is permanently retired (i.e., he stops exerting e↵ort) at the first time that the state of the project hits R. From that point onwards, the other agent continues to work alone. Both agents are compensated only upon completion of the project, and the payments (say V 1 and V 2 ) are chosen such that the agents are indi↵erent with respect to who will retire at R; i.e., their expected discounted payo↵s are equal at q t = R.
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Proposition 6. Suppose the manager employs two agents with quadratic e↵ort costs. Consider the retirement scheme described above, where the retirement state R > max {q 0 , T 1,2 } and T 1,2 is taken from Lemma 1. There exists a threshold ⇥ R > |R| such that the manager is better o↵ implementing this retirement scheme relative to allowing both agents to work together until the project is completed if and only if its length |q 0 | < ⇥ R . First, note that after one agent retires, the other will exert first-best e↵ort until the project is completed. Because the manager's budget is fixed, this retirement scheme is preferable only if it increases the aggregate e↵ort of the team along the evolution path of the project. A key part of the proof involves showing that agents have weaker incentives before one of them is retired as compared to the case in which they always work together (i.e., when a retirement scheme is not used). Therefore, the benefit from having one agent exert first-best e↵ort after one of them retires outweighs the loss from the two agents exerting less e↵ort before one of them retires (relative to the case in which they always work together) only if the project is su ciently short. Hence, this retirement scheme is preferable if and only if |q 0 | < ⇥ R .
From an applied perspective, this result should be approached with caution. In this environment, the agents are (e↵ectively) restricted to playing the MPE, whereas in practice, groups are often able to coordinate to a more e cient equilibrium, for example, by monitoring each other's e↵orts, thus mitigating the free-rider problem (and hence weakening this result). Moreover, Weber (2006) shows that while e cient coordination does not occur in groups that start o↵ large, it is possible to create e ciently coordinated large groups by starting with small groups that find it easier to coordinate, and adding new members gradually who are aware of the group's history. Therefore, one should be aware of the tension between the free-riding e↵ect becoming stronger with progress, and the force identified by Weber.
Asymmetric Contracts
Insofar, I have restricted attention to contracts that compensate the agents symmetrically. However, Proposition 6 suggests that an asymmetric contract that rewards the agents upon reaching intermediate milestones can do better than the best symmetric one if the project is su ciently short. Indeed, the retirement scheme proposed above can be implemented using the following asymmetric rewards-for-milestones contract.
Remark 6. Let Q 1 = R, and suppose that agent 1 receives V as soon as the project is completed, while he receives no intermediate rewards. On the other hand, agent 2 receives the equilibrium present discounted value of B V upon hitting R for the first time (i.e., (B V ) E ⌧ [e r⌧ |R]), and he receives no further compensation, so that he e↵ectively retires at that point. From Proposition 6 we know that there exists a V 2 (0, B) and a threshold ⇥ R such that this asymmetric contract is preferable to a symmetric one if and only if |q 0 | < ⇥ R .
It is important to note that while the expected cost of compensating the agents in the above asymmetric contract is equal to B, the actual cost is stochastic, and in fact, it can exceed the project's payo↵ U . As a result, unless the manager is su ciently solvent, there is a positive probability that she will not be able to honor the contract, which will negatively impact the agents' incentives.
The following result shows that an asymmetric contract may be preferable even if the manager compensates the (identical) agents upon reaching the same milestone; namely, upon completing the project.
Proposition 7. Suppose that the manager has a fixed budget B > 0, and she employs two agents with quadratic e↵ort costs whom she compensates upon completion of the project. Then for all ✏ 2 0, B 2 ⇤ , there exists a threshold T ✏ such that the manager is better o↵ compensating the two agents asymmetrically such that V 1 = B 2 + ✏ and V 2 = B 2 ✏ instead of symmetrically, if and only if the length of the project |q 0 |  T ✏ .
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Intuitively, asymmetric compensation has two e↵ects: First, it causes an e ciency gain in that the agent who receives the smaller share of the payment has weak incentives to exert e↵ort, and hence the other agent cannot free-ride as much. At the same time however, because e↵ort costs are convex, it causes an e ciency loss, as the total costs to complete the project are minimized when the agents work symmetrically; which occurs in equilibrium only when they are compensated symmetrically. By noting that the e ciency loss is increasing in the length of the project, and that the manager's objective is to allocate her budget so as to maximize the agents' expected aggregate e↵ort along the evolution path of the project, it follows that the manager prefers to compensate the agents asymmetrically if the project is su ciently short.
Concluding Remarks
To recap, I study a dynamic problem in which a group of agents collaborate over time to complete a project, which progresses at a rate that depends on the agents' e↵orts, and it generates a payo↵ upon completion. The analysis provides several testable implications. In the context of the Myerlin Repair Foundation (MRF) for example, one should expect that principal investigators will allocate more resources to MRF activities as the goal comes closer into sight. Second, in a drug discovery venture for instance, the model predicts that the amount of time and resources (both individually and on aggregate) that the scientists allocate to the project will be positively related to the group size at the early stages of the project, and negatively related near completion. Moreover, this prediction is consistent with empirical studies of voluntary contributions by programmers to open-source software projects (Yildirim (2006) ). These studies report an increase in the average contributions with the number of programmers, especially in the early stages of the projects, and a decline in the mature stages. Third, the model prescribes that the members of a project team should be compensated asymmetrically if the project is su ciently short.
In a related paper, Georgiadis, Lippman and Tang (2014) consider the case in which the project size is endogenous. Motivated by projects involving design or quality objectives that are often di cult to define in advance, they examine how the manager's optimal project size depends on her ability to commit to a given project size in advance. In another related paper, Ederer, Georgiadis and Nunnari (2014) examine how the team size a↵ects incentives in a discrete public good contribution game using laboratory experiments. Preliminary results support the predictions of Theorem 2.
This paper opens several opportunities for future research. First, the optimal contracting problem is an issue that deserves further exploration. As discussed in Section 5, I have considered a restricted contracting space. Intuitively, the optimal contract will be asymmetric, and it will backload payments (i.e., each agent will be compensated only at the end of his involvement in the project). However, each agent's reward should depend on the path of q t , and hence on the completion time of the project. Second, the model assumes that e↵orts are unobservable, and that at every moment, each agent chooses his e↵ort level after observing the current state of the project. An interesting extension might consider the case in which the agents can obtain a noisy signal of each other's e↵ort (by incurring some cost) and the state of the project is observed imperfectly. The former should allow the agents to coordinate to a more e cient equilibrium, while the latter will force the agents to form beliefs about how close the project is to completion, and to choose their strategies based on those beliefs. Finally, from an applied perspective, it may be interesting to examine how a project can be split into subprojects that can be undertaken by separate teams.
A Additional Results
A.1 Flow Payo↵s while the Project is in Progress
An important assumption of the base model is that the agents are compensated only upon completion of the project. In this Section, I extend the model by considering the case in which during any small [t, t + dt) interval while the project is in progress, each agent receives h (qAssumption 1. h (·) is thrice continuously di↵erentiable on ( 1, 0], it has positive first, second and third derivatives, and it satisfies lim q! 1 h (q) = 0 and h (0)  rV . Using a similar approach as in Section 3, it follows that in a MPE, the expected discounted payo↵ function of agent i satisfies
) subject to (3), and his optimal e↵ort level satisfies
The following Proposition characterizes the unique MPE of this game, and it shows (i) that each agent's e↵ort level is either increasing, or hump-shaped in q, and (ii) the team size comparative static established in Theorem 2 continues to hold. (iii) Under both allocation schemes and for any m > n, there exists a threshold ⇥ n,m ( n,m ) such that a m (q) a n (q) (m a m (q) n a n (q)) if and only if q  ⇥ n,m (q  n,m ). The intuition why e↵ort can be decreasing in q when the project is close to completion can be explained as follows: Far from completion, the agents are incentivized by the future flow payo↵s and the lump sum V upon completion. As the project nears completion, the current flow payo↵s become larger, and hence the agents have less to gain by bringing the project closer to completion, and consequently, they decrease their e↵ort. While establishing conditions under which ! is interior does not seem possible, numerical analysis indicates that this is the case if h (0) r is su ciently close to V .
Finally, statement (iii) follows by noting that J 0 n (q) being unimodal in q is su cient for the proof of Theorem 2. Figure 4 illustrates an example.
A.2 Cancellation States
In this Section, I consider the case in which the project is canceled at the first moment that q t hits some (exogenous) cancellation state Q C > 1 and the game ends with the agents Similarly, by noting that J 0 n (q) being unimodal in q is su cient for the proof of Theorem 2, it follows that even with cancellation states, members of a larger team work harder than members of a smaller team, both individually and on aggregate, if and only if the project is su ciently far from completion. These results are summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 9. Suppose that the project is canceled at the first moment such that q t hits a given cancellation state Q C > 1 and the game ends with the agents receiving 0 payo↵. (i) A symmetric MPE for this game exists, it is unique, and it satisfies 0  J n (q)  V and J 0 n (q) 0 for all q.
(ii) There exists a threshold ! (not necessarily interior) such that each agent's e↵ort a 0 n (q) 0 if and only if q !. (iii) Under both allocation schemes and for any m > n, there exists a threshold ⇥ n,m ( n,m ) such that a m (q) a n (q) (m a m (q) n a n (q)) if and only if q  ⇥ n,m (q  n,m ). While a sharper characterization of the MPE is not possible, numerical analysis indicates that 24 This result requires that lim q! 1 J 0 i (q) = 0. e↵ort increases in q if Q C is su ciently small (i.e., ! = 1), it is U-shaped in q if Q C is in some intermediate range (i.e., ! is interior), while it decreases in q (i.e., ! = 0) if Q C is close to 0. An example is illustrated in Figure 5 .
Intuitively, the agents have incentives to exert e↵ort in order to (i) complete the project, and (ii) avoid hitting the cancellation state Q C . Moreover, observe that the incentives due to the former (latter) are stronger the closer the project is to completion (to Q C ). Therefore, if Q C is small, then the latter incentive is weak, so that the agents' incentives are driven primarily by (i), and e↵ort increases with progress. As Q C increases, (ii) becomes stronger, so that e↵ort becomes U-shaped in q, and if Q C is su ciently close to 0, then the incentives from (ii) dominate those from (i), and consequently, e↵ort decreases in q. Observe that when Q C is small (e.g., Q C = 30), e↵ort increases in q. When Q C is in an intermediate range (e.g., Q C = 10), then e↵ort is U-shaped in q, while it decreases in q if Q C is su ciently large (e.g., Q C = 4.5).
A.3 E↵ort A↵ects Drift and Variance of Stochastic Process
A simplifying assumption in the base model is that the variance of the process that governs the evolution of the project (i.e., ) does not depend on the agents' e↵ort levels. As a result, even if no agent ever exerts any e↵ort, the project is completed in finite time with probability 1. To understand the impact of this assumption, in this Section, I consider the case in which the project progresses according to
25 The expected discounted payo↵ function of agent i satisfies the HJB equation
◆ subject to (3). Restricting attention to symmetric MPE and guessing that each agent's first order condition always binds, it follows that his e↵ort level satisfies a (q) = f
⌘ . Using a similar approach to that used to prove Theorem 1, one can show that a non-trivial solution to this ODE exists. However, the MPE need not be unique in this case: unless a single agent is willing to undertake the project single-handedly, then there exists another equilibrium in which no agent ever exerts any e↵ort, and the project is never completed.
Unfortunately, analyzing how the agents' e↵ort levels change with progress and how individual and aggregate e↵ort depends on the team size is analytically intractable. However, as illustrated in Figure 6 , numerical examples indicate that the main results of the base model continue to hold: e↵ort increases with progress (i.e., a 0 (q) 0 for all q) and the predictions of Theorem 2 continues to hold: under both allocation schemes and for any m > n, there exists a threshold ⇥ n,m ( n,m ) such that a m (q) a n (q) (m a m (q) n a n (q)) if and only if q  ⇥ n,m (q  n,m ).
A.4 Equilibria with Non-Markovian Strategies
Insofar, I have restricted attention to Markovian strategies, so that at every moment, each agent's e↵ort is a function of only the current state of the project q t . This raises the question whether agents can increase their expected discounted payo↵ by adopting non-Markovian strategies that at time t depend on the entire evolution path of the project {q s } st . Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007) study a related model in which the agents can change their actions only at times t = 0, , 2 , .., where > 0 (but small ), and the information structure is similar; i.e., the state variable evolves according to a di↵usion process whose drift is influenced by the agents' actions. They show that the payo↵s from the best symmetric Public Perfect equilibrium (hereafter PPE) converge to the payo↵s corresponding to the MPE as ! 0 (see their Proposition 5).
A natural, discrete-time analog of the model considered in this paper is one in which at t 2 {0, , 2 , ..} each agent chooses his e↵ort level a i,t at cost c (a i,t ) , and at t + the state Figure 6 : An example in which the agents' e↵ort influences both the drift and the variance of the stochastic process. Observe that e↵ort increases in q, and that the predictions of Theorem 2 continue to hold under both allocation schemes.
of the project is equal to q t+ = q t + (
of the similarities between this model and the model in Section VI of Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007) , it is reasonable to conjecture that in the continuous-time limit (i.e., as ! 0), there does not exist a PPE in which agents can achieve a higher expected discounted payo↵ than the MPE at any state of the project. However, because a rigorous proof is di cult for the continuous-time game and the focus of this paper is on team formation and contracting, a formal analysis of non-Markovian PPE of this game is left for future work.
Nevertheless, it is useful to present some intuition. Following Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1986) , an optimal PPE involves a collusive regime and a punishment regime, and in every period, the decision whether to remain in the collusive regime or to switch is guided by the outcome in that period alone. In the context of this model, at t + , each agent will base his decision on q t+ qt . As decreases, two forces influence the scope of cooperation. First, the gain from a deviation in a single period decreases, which helps cooperation. On the other hand, because V q t+ qt = 2 , the agents must decide whether to switch to the punishment regime by observing noisier information, which increases the probability of type I errors (i.e., triggering a punishment when no deviation has occurred), thus hurting cooperation. As Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007) show, the latter force becomes overwhelmingly stronger than the former as ! 0, thus eradicating any gains from cooperation.
A.5 Linear E↵ort costs
The assumption that e↵ort costs are convex a↵ords tractability as it allows for comparative statics despite the fact that the underlying system of HJB equations does not admit a closedform solution. However, convex e↵ort costs also favor larger teams. Therefore, it is useful to examine how the comparative statics with respect to the team size extend to the case in which e↵ort costs are linear; i.e., c (a) = a. In this case, the marginal value of e↵ort is equal to J 0 i (q) 1, so agent i finds it optimal to exert the largest possible e↵ort level if J 0 i (q) > 1, he is indi↵erent across any e↵ort level if J 0 i (q) = 1, and he exerts no e↵ort if J 0 i (q) < 1. As a result, I shall impose a bound on the maximum e↵ort that each agent can exert: a 2 [0, u]. Moreover, suppose that agents are symmetric, and = 0 so that the project evolves deterministically.
26 This game has multiple MPE: (i) a symmetric MPE with bangbang strategies, (ii) a symmetric MPE with interior strategies, and (iii) asymmetric MPE. The reader is referred to Section 5.2 of Georgiadis, Lippman and Tang (2014) for details. Because (ii) is sensitive to the assumption that = 0, I shall focus on the symmetric MPE with bang-bang strategies.
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By using (2) subject to (3) and the corresponding first order condition, it follows that there exists a symmetric MPE in which each agent's discounted payo↵ and e↵ort strategy satisfies
rq nu i 1 {q n} and a n (q) = u1 {q n} ,
. In this equilibrium, the project is completed only if q 0 n . 28 Observe that agents have stronger incentives the closer the project is to completion, as evidenced by the facts that J 00 n (q) 0 for all q, and a n (q) = 1 if and only if q n . To investigate how the agents' incentives depend on the team size, one needs to examine how n depends on n. This threshold decreases in the team size n under both allocation schemes (i.e., both if V n = V and V n = V n for some V > 0) if and only if n is su ciently small. This implies that members of an (n + 1) member team have stronger incentives relative to those of an n member team as long as n is su ciently small.
26 While the corresponding HJB equation can be solved analytically if e↵ort costs are linear, the solution is too complex to obtain the desired comparative statics if > 0.
27 In the MPE with interior strategies, J 0 n (q) = 1 for all q, and the equilibrium e↵ort is chosen so as to satisfy this indi↵erence condition. Together with the boundary condition J n (0) = V n , this implies that J n (q) = 0 and a n (q) = 0 for all q  V n . However, such an equilibrium cannot exist if > 0, because in this case, J n (q) > 0 for all q even if a n (q) = 0.
28 If q 0 2 [ n , 1 ) so that each agent is not willing to undertake the project single-handedly, then there exists another equilibrium in which no agent exerts any e↵ort and the project is never completed.
If agents maximize the team's rather than their individual discounted payo↵, then the firstbest thresholdˆ n = nu r ln ⇣ u rVn+u
⌘
, and it is straightforward to show that it decreases in n under both allocation schemes. Therefore, similar to the case in which e↵ort costs are convex, members of a larger team always have stronger incentives than those of a smaller one.
B Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. This proof is organized in 7 parts. I first show that a MPE for the game defined by (1) exists. Next I show that properties (i) thru (iii) hold, and that the value functions are infinitely di↵erentiable. Finally, I show that with symmetric agents, the equilibrium is symmetric and unique.
Part I: Existence of a MPE.
To show that a MPE exists, it su ces to show that a solution satisfying the system of ordinary nonlinear di↵erential equations defined by (4) subject to the boundary conditions (3) for all i = 1, .., n exists.
To begin, fix some arbitrary N 2 N and rewrite (4) and (3) as
subject to J i,N ( N ) = 0 and
denote the the RHS of (7), where J N and J 0 N are vectors whose i th row corresponds to J i,N (q) and J 0 i,N (q), respectively , and note that g i (·, ·) is continuous. Now fix some arbitrary K > 0, and define a new function
Note that g i,K (·, ·) is continuous and bounded. Therefore, by Lemma 4 in Hartman (1960) , there exists a solution to
This Lemma, which is due to Scorza-Dragoni (1935) , states:
Let g (q, J, J 0 ) be a continuous and bounded (vector-valued) function for ↵  q  and arbitrary (J, J 0 ). Then, for arbitrary q ↵ and q , the system of di↵erential equations J 00 = g (q, J, J 0 ) has at least one solution J = J (q) satisfying J (↵) = q ↵ and J ( ) = q .
The next part of the proof involves showing that there exists aK such that
,K for all i, K and q, which will imply that the solution J i,N,K (·) satisfies (7) for all i. The final step involves showing that a solution exists when N ! 1, so that the first boundary condition in (7) is replaced by lim q! 1 J i (q) = 0.
If the former is true, then the desired inequality holds. Suppose the latter is true. By noting that
for all i and q.
Next, let us focus on J
, or it has a local maximum
, which is a contradiction because J i,N,K (q) 0 for all q. So the latter must be true. Then J follows that J i,N,K (q) < 0 for some q in the neighborhood of z ⇤⇤ , which is a contradiction.
Therefore, it must be the case that J 0 i,N,K (q) 0 for all i and q.
The next step involves establishing that there exists anĀ, independent of N and K, such that
1/p , and (iii) c (x)  x c 0 (x) for all x 0, and letting = r P
, and applying the mean value theorem, it follows that there exists a z BecauseĀ is independent of both N and K, this implies that
, and observe that
⌘ for all i and q 2 [ N, 0]. Therefore, J i,N,K (·) solves (7) for all i.
To show that a solution for (7) exists at the limit as N ! 1, I use the Arzela-Ascoli theorem, which states that:
Consider a sequence of real-valued continuous functions (f n ) n2N defined on a closed and bounded interval [a, b] of the real line. If this sequence is uniformly bounded and equicontinuous, then there exists a subsequence (f n k ) that converges uniformly. Recall that 0  J i,N (q)  V i and that there exists a constantĀ such that 0  J [ N, 0] . By applying the Arzela-Ascoli theorem to a sequence of intervals [ N, 0] and letting N ! 1, it follows that the system of ODE defined by (4) has at least one solution satisfying the boundary conditions (3) for all i.
Finally, note that (i) the RHS of (2) is strictly concave in a i so that the first-order condition is necessary and su cient for a maximum and (ii) J i (q) 2 [0, V i ] for all q and i so that the transversality condition lim t!1 E [e rt J i (q t )] = 0 is satisfied. Therefore, the verification theorem is satisfied (p. 123 in Chang (2004) ), thus ensuring that a solution to the system given by (4) subject to (3) 
⇤⇤ is on the boundary of the desired domain, then
Using (4) we have that
where this bound follows from part I of the proof. Now let h i (q) = |J i (q)| + |J 0 i (q)|, and observe that h i (q) = 0 for all q < z ⇤ , h i (q) 0 for all q, and
o . Fix someẑ < z ⇤ , and applying the di↵erential form of Grönwall's inequality yields
´q z ⇤ Cdx < 1 for all q, and (iii) h i (q) 0 for all q, this inequality implies that J i (q) = 0 for all q. However this contradicts the fact that J i (0) = V i > 0. As a result, J i (·) cannot have an interior minimum, and there cannot exist a z
Then by the mean-value theorem there exists a i (q) = 0 for all i, and by twice integrating both sides of (7) over the interval ( 1, q], we have that
Recall that c (a) = a p+1
p+1
, f (x) = x 1/p , and J 
where 
Part VI: When the agents are symmetric, the MPE is also symmetric. Suppose agents are symmetric; i.e., V i = V j for all i 6 = j. In any MPE, {J i (·)} n i=1 must satisfy (4) subject to (3). Pick two arbitrary agents i and j, and let (q) = J i (q) J j (q). Observe that (·) is smooth, and lim q! 1 (q) = (0) = 0. Therefore either (·) ⌘ 0 on ( 1, 0], which implies that J i (·) ⌘ J j (·) on ( 1, 0] and hence the equilibrium is symmetric, or (·) has at least one interior global extreme point. Suppose the latter is true, and denote this extreme point by z ⇤ . By using (4) and the fact that
Suppose that z ⇤ is a global maximum. Then 00 (z ⇤ )  0, which implies that (z ⇤ )  0.
However, because (0) = 0 and z ⇤ is assumed to be a maximum, (z ⇤ ) = 0. Next, suppose that z ⇤ is a global minimum. Then 00 (z ⇤ ) 0, which implies that (z ⇤ ) 0. However, because (0) = 0 and z ⇤ is assumed to be a minimum, (z ⇤ ) = 0. Therefore it must be the case that (·) ⌘ 0 on ( 1, 0]. Since i and j were chosen arbitrarily, J i (·) ⌘ J j (·) on ( 1, 0] for all i 6 = j, which implies that the equilibrium is symmetric.
Part VII: Suppose that V i = V j for all i 6 = j. Then the system of ordinary nonlinear di↵erential equations defined by (4) subject to (3) has at most one solution. From Part VI of the proof, we know that if agents are symmetric, then the MPE is symmetric. Therefore to facilitate exposition, I drop the notation for the i th agent. Any solution J (·) must satisfy 
and In light of the fact that J 0 i (q) > 0 for all q, it follows that the first-order condition for each agent's best response always binds. As a result, any MPE must satisfy the system of ODE defined by (4) subject to (3). Since this system of ODE has a unique solution with n symmetric, it follows that in this case, the dynamic game defined by (1) has a unique MPE.
Proof of Proposition 1. See online Appendix.
Hence either D n,m (·) is decreasing in which case ⇥ n,m = 1, or there exists an interior ⇥ n,m such that a m (q) a n (q) if and only if q  ⇥ n,m . The details are omitted.
and observe that the first term in the RHS is strictly positive. Now suppose z ⇤ is a global minimum. ThenD 00 n,m (z ⇤ ) 0, which implies thatD n,m (z ⇤ ) > 0, but this contradicts the facts that lim q! 1Dn,m (q) = 0 and z ⇤ is interior. Hence z ⇤ must be a global maximum or a local extreme point satisfyingD n,m (z ⇤ ) 0.
To complete the proof for this case, I now show thatD n,m (·) can be at most single-peaked. Suppose that the contrary is true. Then there exists a local maximum z ⇤ followed by a local minimumz > z ⇤ . BecauseD n (z), it follows thatD n,m (z ⇤ ) <D n,m (z). However, this contradicts the facts that z ⇤ is a local maximum andz is a local minimum, which implies thatD n,m (·) is either strictly increasing in which case n,m = 0, or it has a global interior maximum and no other local extreme points, in which case there exists an interior n,m such that m a m (q) n a n (q) if and only if q  n,m .
Proof for (ii) under Budget Allocation
The only di↵erence compared to the proof under public good allocation is the boundary expected discounted profit is higher under scheme (a) relative to scheme (b) for any choice of Q k 's and w k 's.
Part I: To begin, I introduce the expected discounted payo↵ and discount rate functions that will be necessary for the proof. Under scheme (a), given the current state q, each agent's expected discounted payo↵ satisfies rJ (q) = c (f (J 0 (q)))+nf (J 0 (q)) J 0 (q)+ On the other hand, under scheme (b), given the current state q and that k 1 milestones have been reached, each agent's expected discounted payo↵, which is denoted by J k (q), satisfies
The first boundary condition states that as q ! 1, the expected time until the project is completed diverges to 1, so that lim q! 1 T (q) = 0. On the other hand, when the project is completed so that q = 0, then ⌧ = 0 with probability 1, which implies that T (0) = 1.
Next, let us consider scheme (b). Similarly, we denote the expected present discounted value function, given the current state q and that k 1 milestones have been reached, by T k (q) = E ⌧ k [e r⌧ k | q]. Then, it follows that
subject to lim
The first boundary condition has the same interpretation as above. The second boundary condition ensures value matching; i.e., that upon reaching milestone k for the first time, T k (Q k ) = T k+1 (Q k ). Using the same approach as used in Theorem 3, it is straightforward to show that T (·) and for each k, T k (·) exists, it is unique, smooth, strictly positive, and strictly increasing on its domain.
Note that by Jensen's inequality,
. Therefore, using this inequality, and the second boundary condition for J k (·), it follows that
Part II: The next step of the proof is to show that for any k, J (Q k ) J k (Q k ), and as a consequence of Proposition 1 (i), J 0 (q) J 0 k (q) for all q  Q k . This will imply that agents exert higher e↵ort under scheme (a) at every state of the project. To proceed, let us define
for all k, and note that lim , where x < 1, and observe that the term in brackets is non-negative if and only if
Because the RHS is strictly increasing in x, and it converges to the LHS as x ! 1, it follows that the above inequality holds.
Suppose that z is a global minimum. Then 00 K (z) 0 together with the fact that the term in brackets is strictly positive implies that K (z) > 0. Therefore, any interior global minimum must satisfy K (z) 0, which in turn implies that K (q) 0 for all q. As a result,
Now consider K 1 (·), and note that lim q! 1 K 1 (q) = 0. By using the last inequality, that
Therefore, either K 1 (·) is increasing on ( 1, Q K 1 ], or it has some interior global extreme point z < Q K 1 such that 0 K 1 (z) = 0. If the former is true, then K 1 (Q K 2 ) 0. If the latter is true, then by applying the same technique as above we can again conclude that
Proceeding inductively, it follows that for all k 2 {2, .., K}, k (Q k 1 ) 0 or equivalently
0 for all q, which together with (5) implies that [A m (q) A n (q)] F 0 n (q) = 0 for all q, where A n (·) ⌘ na n (·). However, this is a contradiction, because A m (q) > A n (q) for at least some q by Theorem 2 (ii), and F 0 n (q) > 0 for all q by Theorem 3 (i). Therefore, n,m (·) has at least one global extreme point, which I denote byz. By using that Proof of Proposition 5. All other parameters held constant, the manager chooses the team size n 2 N to maximize her expected discounted profit at q 0 ; i.e., she chooses n (|q 0 |) = arg max n2N {F n (q 0 )}. By noting that the necessary conditions for the Monotonicity Theorem (i.e., Theorem 4) of Milgrom and Shannon (1994) to hold are satisfied, it follows that the optimal team size n (|q 0 |) is (weakly) increasing in the project length |q 0 |.
Proof of Propositions 6-9. See online Appendix.
